MALAYSIA and Thailand recently unveiled plans to join BRICS, rechristened BRICS+ with the induction of new members, a multilateral bloc of rising economies of the 21st century.
BRICS — an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — is seen as an emerging institutional collective of the global south countries that aspire to establish an inclusive multipolar world order.
BRICS+ represents nearly 3.64 billion people, or 45.78 per cent of the world's population.
Together, members' economies are worth more than US$28.5 trillion, about 28 per cent of the global economy. It has also been said that at least 34 other countries have indicated their interest in joining the bloc.
With Malaysia's and Thailand's intention to join BRICS+, the grouping is making solid inroads into the Asean region.
Indonesia has also shown similar intentions. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia could be potential candidates in the future.
Rumour has it that Turkiye is mulling over joining BRICS+.
BRICS aims to establish itself as a platform for developing nations to express their concerns and interests about the design and functioning of the international financial architecture.
The growing acceptability of BRICS/BRICS+ is a tell-tale sign of the ruptures in the international order.
Looking at BRICS from the binaries of the United States-China/Russia rivalry may not sufficiently explain the emerging dynamics.
A closer look at BRICS members' stance on issues related to global institutions and international governmental organisations reveals that their policy positions are in sync, especially in the domain of international financial architecture.
BRICS encourages the use of local currencies in transactions among member states.
BRICS and BRICS+ represent the voices of the global south, which has been urging the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for substantive reforms and to be more accountable and inclusive.
Additionally, BRICS has advocated for comprehensive reform of the United Nations Security Council, claiming that the veto powers of the five permanent members do not represent the interests of the international community.
Malaysia's decision to steer clear of fallout from the growing US-China competition is understandable, but for Thailand, a long-standing and close ally of the US, to choose BRICS comes as a surprise to many.
Reading too much of the "China factor" would be misleading here.
For one, while Malaysia is yet to make its position on the Indo-Pacific clear, it joined the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework long before it expressed any interest in BRICS.
Likewise, there has been no downward trend in Thailand's relations with the US and the West.
BRICS, then, is more about grabbing multilateral opportunities than being a part of an anti-US or anti-West club.
The presence of India, Saudi Arabia and the UAE already dilutes any such attempts, or narratives for that matter.
At the 42nd Asean Summit, member states agreed to promote the use of local currency in transactions. This appears to be the bloc's strategy for transitioning away from established currencies like the US dollar.
Given that Washington has weaponised the US dollar through the growing use of unilateral sanctions, Asean countries are seemingly preparing themselves for a situation where their trade gets affected by sanctions.
With the US-China trade war and decoupling going on for the past few years, it is also understandable that countries feel vulnerable due to their strong trade with China and dependence on the US dollar for trade.
It makes sense for them to trade in local and non-US currencies.
In other words, de-dollarisation is a safety measure to deal with US sanctions on its rivals and adversaries, including Russia (but also China).
Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim said Malaysia ought to look at de-dollarisation, and he even backed the concept of an Asian Monetary Fund.
Southeast Asian nations are growing more cautious about the dollar's involvement in US sanctions.
These apprehensions are not without reason. For instance, Anwar, who has been vocal in expressing his concerns about the plight of the Palestinians, has attracted threats of sanctions from Western countries and their representatives in Malaysia.
The US Treasury Department slapped penalties on four Malay-sian-based businesses in December 2023, alleging that they had assisted Iran in producing drones.
The US charges Iran with providing lethal drones to Russia for use in Ukraine and to what it claims are terrorist proxies in the Middle East.
A semiconductor business in Malaysia was one of 300 organisations that were sanctioned by Washington for their purported connections to Russian military supplies.
In a keynote address at the Semicon Southeast Asia tech conference last month, Anwar pitched his country as the ideal "neutral and non-aligned" host for semiconductor makers amid the US-China tech war and said his government would aim to attract US$100 billion in new investments.
He called the US an important investment partner and export destination for chips made in Malaysia, but stressed that his administration could not legitimise unilateral sanctions that compromised his country's independence.
Economist Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs said BRICS+ members would account for 40 per cent of the global economy by 2050.
BRICS nations contributed more than 45 per cent of the global GDP growth between 2012 and 2022, with China accounting for around 25 per cent.
Due to its economic strength and growing role in international affairs, China is seen as a key member of BRICS, from intra-bloc trade flows and the bloc's foreign policy perspectives.
From 2009 to 2023, China has remained Malaysia's most significant trading partner, accounting for US$95.8 billion in total trade. China is Thailand's largest trade partner as well.
Registering uninterrupted growth over the past five years, Chinese-Thai trade grew to US$135 billion in 2023.
It makes good business sense for Malaysia and Thailand to join BRICS.
That said, China is not the only factor binding BRICS+ together. BRICS is much more than China, or Russia for that matter.
Already linked in multifarious ways with China through bilateral and Asean-led multilateral mechanisms, Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Thailand do not have to reach out to forums like BRICS to engage China.
BRICS is also about India, South Africa and Brazil, the three key rising economies in the financial system and global politics that have healthy and strong ties with the US and its allies in the Western and Asian spheres as well.
BRICS, which started primarily as an economic initiative to facilitate the transition of economic clout to the global south, has grown into an important multilateral grouping.
The presence of China and Russia, and the diverse nature of membership present challenges and opportunities to BRICS.
BRICS will present a counter-narrative to the West-led liberal international order, where varying perspectives of the global south would get synthesised as one representing a "common minimum agenda" of the bloc rather than a "Sino-Russian club with some friends".
Members' heavy economic and trade dependence on China and deteriorating sentiment towards Beijing's diplomatic acceptability make it vulnerable.
India's fast growth and increasing geopolitical heft also pose a challenge to the continuation of BRICS as a China-centric grouping.
Going by the examples of other large groupings like the EU or Asean, a growing multi-regional and multilateral bloc may not be able to produce any alliance-style outcomes given the differences in economic status, cultural background, individual country agendas and their respective balancing acts vis-à-vis the US and its allies.
Malaysia's and Thailand's entry will further democratise BRICS' multilateralism, keeping it a few more steps away from being dominated by a few members, which is precisely what BRICS stands for.
The writer is associate professor, Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India